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The paper introduces a specification of the demand side which allows RPM to have different
effects on prices and on service, which may increase or decrease due to RPM. A feature of the
model which deviates from those found in the literature is due to the introduction of a class of
consumers who do not search but decide on a purchase spontaneously. More interestingly social
welfare is reduced by RPM (at least locally) exactly under those circumstances where RPM
induces higher service (and price). Hence, welfare decreases exactly in the case which was
frequently presented for the justification of RPM to promote service.
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Resale Price Maintenance and the Service
Argument (in the Book Trade)
The issue of resale price maintenance (RPM) has a long history. In the
English-speaking world one attributes its beginning to the pricing of Alfred
Marshall’s Principles of Economics (Breit (1991)). However, the evidence for
RPM e.g. in Germany, reaches back for a considerably longer time (Picot
(1991)). But it is not merely a greeting from the distant past. Every once in
while it becomes a hot topic in the political scene. Germany had recently a
debate on resale price maintenance in the book trade which led to the
remarkable situation that resale price maintenance is mandatory by law in this
sector (since 2002), while it is forbidden per se for all other sectors.
Theoretically, this could reflect the ambivalent evaluation of RPM by the
profession, where a positive attitude on the grounds of efficiency within a
supply chain is counterbalanced by concerns about competition impeding
effects. The efficiency defense for RPM is prominently connected to the
service argument. Unconstrained price competition is said to lead to an
inadequate supply of service. The free rider argument which posits that a
customer may ask for product information (service) in one shop and than buy
at a different shop which does not provide such information and can therefore
offer the product at a cheaper price is one – albeit an extreme - variant of the
efficiency argument (Mathewson and Winter (1998)). Indeed, in its extreme
form this argument is not convincing in the book trade. Nevertheless, service
in the form of space for presentation of books plays an important role in the
book sector. When the “net book agreement” (NBA) collapsed in Great
Britain, it is reported that the space for presentation of books increased
(Monopolkommission (2000)). Hence, at least in this variant the service
argument has at least some merit in the deliberations of the parties of a supply
chain and cannot easily be dismissed. This increase in service may also have
increased the utility of customers.
For a considerable time the effects of RPM on impeded competition were
connected to the fear that either producers or retailers could be more easily
form a cartel. As to the start of the German form of RPM in the book trade
this has quite some evidence to its validity. Its beginnings are usually
attributed to the fear of book sellers that mail order sellers may spoil their
market. This would support the argument that retailers can more easily form aResale Price Maintenance 2
cartel, when RPM is available. This view is, however, dismissed by most
commentators for the current situation. At this point it should be stressed that
the efficiency rationale which is coined at the interest of the parties of a
supply chain, is not necessarily in the interest of the consumers. And
therefore – even if RPM may be efficiency improving for the firms involved –
overall efficiency may decrease. But as long as we regard an efficiency
rationale the latter should be the ultimate measuring rod.
These remarks set the agenda for this paper. We know from R. Winter
(1993) that a monopolistic producer would want to impose a price floor on
the grounds of the service argument, if consumers are more sensitive to price
competition than to service competition (this argument will be made more
explicit in the main body of the paper). Winter’s paper provides a model of
the demand side which supports that consumers are more sensitive to price
competition. The current paper deviates from this approach in that consumers
in the aggregate can be more price sensitive or more service sensitive. This
concerns an issue which has obvious relevance according to some
commentators of the British situation. Some prices and service levels have
increased while others have decreased after the break down of the British
NBA. Secondly, the issue of the overall efficiency effects are taken up
1. The
main result is that prices (and service) may decrease or increase due to RPM
and that total efficiency increases or decreases according to whether prices
and services jointly decrease or increase.
This is an interesting result. It says among other things that service (and
prices) may increase if RPM is not available. This invalidates the usual claim
that service will decrease (by necessity according to the usual arguments).
More interestingly, RPM has its strength if it impedes oversupply of service –
quite to the contrary to the usual argument.
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. Section 1 gives
some details on RPM in the book trade in Europe and especially in Germany.
Section 2 provides the model used in this paper together with some
supporting arguments as to the modeling approach. Section 3 establishes the
equilibrium result and section 4 establishes the welfare result (locally).
Section 5 concludes and relates the result to different additional contributions
in the literature.
                                                          
1 Winter’s contribution only contains a numerical example hinting at the possibility that service
and price may be too high from the social point of view.Resale Price Maintenance 3
1. Resale price maintenance in the German book trade
The German history of RPM in the book trade dates back at least to 1888
when the Körner reform was established. This was a contractual arrangement
between bookstores and publishers. Booksellers which signed the contract
were not allowed to offer rebates on the price which was fixed by the
publisher. Publishers were not allowed to supply books to booksellers not
signing the contract. They did, however, have the right not to fix a price. At
the end of 20-th century about 90% of the turnover in the German book trade
had resale price maintenance imposed. Harsh sanctions deterred any deviating
behavior.
This arrangement remained essentially intact until 2002, when it was
replaced by law. RPM was forbidden in general by German competition law
in the 1970s. However, the book trade obtained an exception from the rule.
With the rise of an active competition policy of the European Union RPM
was forbidden whenever trade among member states was involved. This
became particularly important when the internet offered easy opportunities to
deliver books to German customers from other member states like Austria. In
this context many commentators observed that the contractual arrangement
(“Sammelrevers”) in Germany is not compatible with European competition
law. A hot debate started as to whether RPM should be kept in place or not.
In the end, the German government opted for a law (Preisbindungsgesetz)
forcing all publishers to fix their book prices. The treaty of the European
Union allows member states to take measures to protect their cultural identity.
It was argued that the law is necessary to do just that. At the formal level,
economic reasoning played no essential role.
However, before the law was passed the debate was also taken up by
economists. A report commissioned by the “Börsenverein des Deutschen
Buchhandels” - the institution which supervised the RPM-arrangement in
Germany - (Rürup (1997)) came to the conclusion that RPM should be kept in
place because efficiency advantages were conjectured to dominate any
competitive harm. The German Monopoly Commission called for an ending
of RPM in the book trade in their biannual report (Monopolkommission
(2000)). Among other arguments it stressed the point that there is no evidence
available that the quality of service is of higher importance in the book trade
than in other sectors. Moreover it did not find empirical evidence that the
book trade underperformed in states without RPM. In particular the
experience of breakdown of the British NBA about 1995 provided no
indication that without RPM service deteriorated. To the contrary, as
mentioned above the space for presentation of books increased. There was
also no clear evidence that prices dropped sharply on average which seems toResale Price Maintenance 4
be the fear of proponents of RPM. Again to the contrary, the resale price
index for books increased by more than the general resale price index after
the breakdown while it developed roughly in line before. Admittedly, the
period of time which the Monopoly Commission was able to observe in Great
Britain was short, too short to justify general conclusions.
It seems therefore warranted to refine our theoretical understanding of the
consequences of RPM as long as clear empirical evidence is not available.
And it is hoped that this theoretical understanding will improve empirical
work. As mentioned above, in theory prices and service quality may change
in both directions if RPM becomes unavailable. Can we say more about the
determinants of the direction of change? If we can do that, can we say
something about the overall change in efficiency? The following model was
set up to shed light on these questions and to provide some answers.
2. The model
The general modeling approach follows closely that of R. Winter (1993). One
monopolistic publisher produces books which are sold by two book sellers to
the consumers. This fits the situation in the book trade quite well. The
product is a book title and its copyright belongs to exactly one publisher. The
retail sector of this trade is not particularly concentrated. Modeling
competition as a duopoly without much bargaining power vis à vis the
publisher seems therefore adequate.
According to many observers books are often bought by incidence. A
consumer strolling through a city may suddenly decide to visit a book store
and to find out what is on offer, although he had no intent to do so, when he
decided to go downtown. Customers of this type typically do not actively
search. Once a bookstore is entered he only decides whether or not a book
that he finds promising is worth its price. But he will not visit another
bookstore in order to search for a better price (in a world without RPM). If all
consumers were of this type there would be no essential role for competition
among retailers but for showy appearances in order to attract the consumers
attention. A bookstore could more or less act like a local monopolist.
Certainly, not all consumers are of this type. Some decide to go downtown
in order to buy a specific book or a book of a certain type e.g. a novel or a
textbook. These consumers will also decide ex ante where to buy. They may
prefer one store to another because it is closer in distance or because it
exhibits a nicer atmosphere. But they may also decide on the grounds of
information about price and service quality at that store.Resale Price Maintenance 5
Our model allows for both types of consumers. This deviates from the
demand model in R. Winter (1993) which only captures the second type of
consumers. We follow Winter to a large extent in modeling this type of
consumers. But we simplify his model by assuming that these consumers will
buy a book in any case which seems adequate in the present context. Stores
are modeled as being located at the end points of a Hotelling line of length 1.
There is a continuum of consumers each characterized by its location on the
line. As usual the location can be interpreted geographically or in terms of
product differentiation (atmosphere, appearance, internet shop versus mortar
and brick store). The distribution of consumers with respect to their location
is assumed to be uniform (another simplification compared with Winter). The
mass of these consumers is denoted by β.
The service level and the price of store i is denoted by si and pi resp. The
service should be interpreted as dedicated to a book title. It may include
personnel having read the book and thus being able to advise customers
properly or it may include presenting the book at a prominent place or
providing reports by critics on its content and quality.
The utility of a consumer located at α when patronizing store 1 (which is
located at 0) is assumed to be
α b p es − − 1 1
An analogous expression denotes the utility of this consumer when he
purchases the book at store 2 (which is located at 1 and there α has to be
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with an analogous expression for the demand facing store 2.
The class of spontaneous consumers is characterized by the utility
i i p ls A − +
when a consumer visits store i. These customers differ in their reservation
utility A0 which is distributed uniformly in [ 0, 1 ]. For each store the number
of consumers which drop in spontaneously is normalized to one. The demand
at store i from these customers is therefore equal to the expression denoting
the utility of a customer. Hence demand from both types of consumers
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As for the cost structure of the firms we assume that the publisher has
constant marginal cost which we normalize to 0 and some fixed cost which
are sufficiently small to not influence the decision variables of the publisher.
Therefore the fixed cost will be neglected in the following. The provision of
service is costly to the bookstores. Providing the level of si costs 2 /
2
i cs .
The pricing behavior of the publisher vis à vis the booksellers follows
again Winter (1993). The publisher charges store i a price qi per book and a
fee Fi independently of the volume of sales. This captures among other things
the use of rebates which are quite common in the relationship between
publishers and bookstores. It also provides the publisher with an instrument to
work against the problem of double marginalization.
The profit of bookstore i is therefore:
i i j i j i i i i j i j i i F cs s s p p D q p s s p p − − − = 2 / ) , , , ( ) ( ) , , , (
2 π
Without RPM bookstores choose their level of price and service given qi and
Fi . With RPM the price is fixed by the publisher and the bookstores can only
choose their level of service. In slight misuse of notation we denote the
equilibrium choices as pi (·) and si (·) in both cases.
The publisher’s profit is
∑
=
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = Π
2
1
) )) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ( (
i
i j i j i i i F s s p p D q
where under RPM pi (·) equals the price which the publisher chooses.
3. The consequences of RPM for prices and service
Given the complete symmetry of the bookstores we will concentrate on
symmetric equilibrium configurations. Hence prices and service levels are
equal for both book stores. Under RPM prices are of course equal by
definition of RPM.
To ease notation we will denote A + β/2 by a, eβ/2b by w and β/2b by d.
Thus bookstore i now faces demand
). ( ) ( ) , , , ( i j j i i i j i j i i p p d s s w p ls a s s p p D − + − + − + =Resale Price Maintenance 7
The demand system as modeled by Winter (1993) yields a clear answer
with respect to the consequences of RPM for prices and service: It increases
both, prices and service. This is not the case in our model: With RPM the
price and the service level turns out to be











The appendix provides a proof of this result as well as proofs for all other
assertions in this and the following section. At this point it should be noted
that we impose some parameter restrictions which guarantee concavity of the
relevant profit functions. They also imply that all prices are positive.
With RPM the parameters reflecting some competition among the
bookstores, w and d, play no role. This is to be expected. RPM eliminates any
price competition. Equal prices imply that the publisher is exclusively
interested in aggregate demand which does not depend on w.
If RPM is not an option for the publisher prices and service turn out to be
) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
)) ( ) ( ) 1 ( (
2
2
w l w w l l d d c
w l w w l dl d c a
pc
+ + + + − +
+ + + − +
=
) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
) )( 1 (
2 w l w w l l d d c
w l d a
sc
+ + + + − +
+ +
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In general pRPM and pc do not coincide and the same is true for sRPM and sc .
It is also clear that the publisher’s profit will be less in general, if RPM is not
available. With RPM he could otherwise choose pc as price and ask a price qi
such that bookstores would choose sc. As the optimal decision under RPM
differs from these levels it must be true that the profit of the publisher is
smaller without RPM.
Turning to the main result of this section we can state
Proposition 1: (a) If w < dl then pRPM > pc and sRPM > sc .
   (b) If w > dl then pRPM < pc and sRPM < sc .
Hence depending on the parameter values prices and service may move in
different directions if RPM is enabled. Only if w = dl nothing changes. Note
that the inequality w < dl can also be written as e < l, where l stands for the
impact of service on the utility of spontaneous customers and e for the impact
on the utility of the other type of customers.Resale Price Maintenance 8
This result may help to explain why prices of different types of books
developed in different directions when the NBA broke down. The demand for
scientific literature could be argued to be quite insensitive to service for those
customers who visit a bookstore based on an conscious ex ante decision to
buy a specific title. Well trained personnel in the content or presentation
should play a very minor role for those customers. For spontaneous customers
a prominent presentation may be a welcome reminder that they always
wanted to buy this book. Hence e < l captures this situation and in line with
our result the prices of scientific books are reported to have declined after the
NBA breakdown. The price of pocket books on the other hand increased. At
least for novels this is also consistent with our theoretical result. Think of the
situation that you only know that you want to buy a novel of a specific genre.
Then well trained personnel becomes important as well as the presentation in
the store which speaks for a high e. For spontaneous customers the advice of
trained personnel is not that important, as they just browse around. This
speaks for a relatively small l. It is not claimed here that these arguments
explain the movement of prices in Great Britain fully. There are many more
influences than we capture in this simple model. But the facts seem quite
consistent with the result.














where εp denotes the price elasticity and εs denotes the service elasticity of
demand. The index M relates to the elasticities at the market level while the
index  r relates to the elasticities at the level of one retailer. One way of
interpreting this equality is thus: If at the level of one retailer (bookstore)
consumers are easier attracted by a decrease in price than by an increase in
service, than competition among bookstores will drive down prices. As
service than is worth less it will also decrease. RPM can than be used to
stabilize a higher level of service. In Winter’s model the demand system
satisfies this inequality.
Given that this characterization for a price increasing effect of RPM is
quite general (at least locally) it is not surprising that Proposition 1 is fully
consistent with this inequality. The condition in part (a) can easily be checked
to be a special case of the above inequality. But – deviating from Winter - our
demand system is flexible enough to allow for the reversed inequality to hold,
which is the case in part (b). As we have seen, casual empirical evidence
supports the view that both directions of prices can be observed after RPM is
no longer practiced.Resale Price Maintenance 9
4. The consequences of RPM for efficiency
While the effects of RPM on efficiency are at the core of most arguments
which question its prohibition per se, the notion of efficiency is mostly
focused on the inner workings of a supply chain. Gross profits for all firms
involved is taken as the measuring rod for efficiency. In most cases the
interests of consumers are kept out of the formal analysis. There seems to be
a common understanding that more service is always better for consumers.
But this clearly does not have to hold in general. Service is costly. A firm has
an incentive to increase service until the additional revenue from a marginal
consumer equates the marginal cost of providing enough service to attract this
consumer. But the inframarginal consumers may or may not experience an
increase in utility which would cover the additional costs. In other words, it is
not clear whether customers enjoy more service given that the induced costs
have to be covered.
Fortunately, our model can shed some light on the question whether social
surplus increases or decreases with RPM. Our starting point is the situation
where prices and service levels are the same under RPM and without it. In our
model this is the case if w = dl. We can show that the difference between the
social surplus without RPM, Wc, and the social surplus with RPM, WRPM,
decreases in w. This is the main result of this section:







The proof is again in the appendix. Note that at w = dl we have Wc = WRPM
and that therefore a move of w (implicitly a move of e) into the direction
w > dl yields lower social surplus without RPM than with RPM. Hence RPM
can be socially helpful if it works against excessively high prices and service.
More interestingly, in the case when w moves into the direction w < dl
RPM decreases welfare. But this is exactly the case which figures so
prominently in the literature – stressing the fear that service may be too low
without RPM. From the point of view of the firms involved this is true. But
the reverse is true for society! The increased service due to RPM is not worth
its costs.
The result is also in line with the numerical example in Winter (1993). Of
course, it must be conceded that the result is a local one. A glance at the
expressions for W in the appendix reveals that a global result is not easy to
obtain. Attempts to obtain such a result were not successful so far, although
preliminary thoughts tend to point to the validity of such a result.Resale Price Maintenance 10
It should also be noted that we have abstained from modeling interbrand
competition in any way. While it is true that a publisher usually holds an
exclusive copyright on a book title, books of similar types are substitutable to
a certain extent. It is a frequent result in the study of vertical restraints that
negative efficiency effects are weakened by interbrand competition (cp.
Motta (2004)). But usually these negative effects remain in existence
whenever competition is not very intense. And thus the warning included in
proposition 2 that RPM may have negative consequences in terms of
efficiency seems justified.
5 Concluding remarks
The paper introduces a specification of the demand side which allows RPM to
have different effects on prices and on service, which may increase or
decrease due to RPM. More interestingly social welfare is reduced by RPM
exactly under those circumstances where RPM induces higher service (and
price).
A feature of the model which deviates from those found in the literature is
due to the introduction of a class of customers who do not search but decide
on a purchase spontaneously. This is certainly an adequate modeling strategy
with respect to the book trade. But it may also be adequate for other product
markets, especially those where the price of the commodity represents a
relatively small fraction of the consumer’s budget.
While the prices and the service level are influenced by the relative
importance of those consumers who do search, the qualitative effect of RPM
on prices, service, and social surplus are not affected, as can be easily
checked.
The findings of the paper support the view that RPM may have an
efficiency enhancing potential which always sheds doubt on a per se
prohibition of RPM – especially when other forms of vertical restraints are
not prohibited per se. But the concern for the problem points into a different –
more precisely an opposite – direction. While usually the concern is directed
at RPM helping to establish higher service quality, we find that this is not the
problem on a market without RPM practice. To the contrary, this is exactly
the situation where RPM is not efficiency enhancing if the social surplus
criterion is applied.
The most serious omissions of the model concern the absence of
competition among publishers and the absence of uncertainty which certainly
is of considerable importance for the production of a specific book.
Competition is only very loosely incorporated in the model as the cost ofResale Price Maintenance 11
service can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of not providing prominent
shelf space or informational service for other books (of a rival publisher).
Given the vast number of book titles available shelf space is certainly scarce
and it also impossible for the personnel to be properly informed about all
books of certain genre.
There are some contributions to the literature dealing with the scarcity of
shelf space in the retail sector, most prominently by Shaffer (1991a, 1991b).
However, both papers are of restricted importance to the book trade. In
Shaffer (1991b) a multi-product monopolist tries to convince retailers (which
all enjoy a local monopoly) to stock their full line of products. It is shown
that one possibility of reaching the full integration result consists in imposing
RPM and paying a flat fee for shelf space. Competition is only present, as
retailers have the option to use their shelf space for presentation of
commodities of another competitive industry which is not specified more
precisely. Aside from the fact that competition is not modeled in any more
detail than in the present paper, the desire to be present on the shelves of a
book store seems to be of less importance in the book trade contrary to the
situation in other industries. At least in Germany, publishers are not known to
buy prominent shelf space as is the case in other sectors. This is probably at
least partly due to the fact that a well organized whole-sale market exists. In
Shaffer (1991a) manufacturers are perfectly competitive and sell to retailers
with considerable market power. This scenario seems not well suited for the
book trade in Germany. Contributions which address the service argument for
RPM in a context of interbrand as well as intrabrand competition are not
known to the best of my knowledge.
The success of books is usually very uncertain at the time of production.
The management of the corresponding risk is therefore an important part of
the strategy of publishers and retailers alike. Deneckere et al. (1996, 1997)
have taken up demand uncertainty and its relationship to RPM in two
remarkable papers. They show that a monopolistic manufacturer has an
incentive to impose RPM on its sales to perfectly competitive retailers and
that this imposition may (but need not) improve welfare and even expected
consumer surplus. One driving force of the result is that retailers have to
order inventories before uncertainty unveils and that the costs of these
inventories are completely sunk. Again, while a very interesting result by
itself, it fits the book trade less well. The uncertainty in those papers deals
with the demand of one specific homogenous commodity. If a manufacturer
produces essentially one product this is a suitable modeling strategy. A
publisher, however, produces a whole line of new books each year.
Possibilities to form a less risky portfolio of titles are open to a publisher. In
addition, it is quite common that publishers take back unsold inventories.Resale Price Maintenance 12
Hence costs related to inventories are not completely sunk. But this drives the
results of those papers. Hence, it is not clear how the results would change if
both aspects of the book trade would be incorporated, let alone the main issue
of the present paper: the service argument.
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Appendix A1: Prices and Service with RPM
Recall that demand can be written as
) ( ) ( ) , , , ( i j j i i i j i j i i p p d s s w p ls a s s p p D − + − + − + =
and that the aim of the publisher is
∑
=
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = Π
2
1
) )) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ( (
i
i j i j i i i F s s p p D q
The usual argument applies to show that Fi will be set such that booksellers
obtain a reservation profit of 0. This implies
2 / ) , , , ( ) (
2
i j i j i i i i i cs s s p p D q p F − − =
and the profit of the publisher becomes:
∑
=
− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = Π
2
1
2 ) 2 / )) ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ( (
i
i j i j i i i cs s s p p D p
As prices are equal for both booksellers with RPM, this reads in more specific
terms:




1 2 1 s s c p s s l a p + − − + + = Π
Suppose the publisher could directly set p and both si. Then maximizing the
profit would yield the first order conditions:
0 4 ) ( 2 2 1 = − + + p s s l a
0 = − i cs pl
Solving this system gives the expressions for pRPM and sRPM.
For these expressions to make sense, c has to be large enough which is
assumed in the following.
In our setup the publisher cannot directly set sRPM. It remains to be shown
that he can implement this level of service by charging a suitable price qi to
the retailers. In the RPM context the profit of retailer i is:Resale Price Maintenance 14
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2 π
Maximizing with respect to si gives the first order condition:
i i cs w l q p = + − ) )( (
In order to obtain the service level sRPM, the publisher should therefore set qi
according to
) )( 2 ( ) )( 2 ( 2
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which establishes the result.
Appendix A.2 Prices and service without RPM
If retailers choose their price as well as the service level the profit takes the
form
i i i j j i i i i i i F cs p p d s s w p ls a q p − − − + − + − + − = 2 / )) ( ) ( )( (
2 π
which is concave in the retailers own price and service level, if c is large
enough. More specifically we will assume:
) )( , max( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( w l w l d c A + > +
The first order conditions can be written as:
0 ) 1 ( 2 ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = + + − − + + + + j i j i i dp p d ws s w l d q a
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As announced in the main body of the paper we will concentrate on the
symmetric solutions. Hence we posit q1 = q2 = q and this implies p1 = p2 = p.
Then (3) becomes:
p w l l c d w l l c d q ac )) ( ) 2 (( )) ( ) 1 (( + − + = + − + +
which gives
) ( ) 2 (
)) ( ) 1 ((
) ( ) 4 (
w l l c d
w l l c d q ac
q p
+ − +
+ − + +
=
Inserting this back into the solution of (2) gives
) ( ) 2 (
) )( (
) ( ) 5 (
w l l c d





For the same reasons as in appendix A.1 the profit of the publisher can
now be written as:
) ( ))) ( ), ( ( )) ( ), ( ( )( (
2
2 1 q cs q s q p D q s q p D q p − + = Π
Note that the first order conditions for the retailers’ equilibrium have the
form:
0 ) ( ) 2 (

























This form will be used in a moment. Consider now the first order condition


































































































































































































































and using the specific expressions for the demand system gives:









+ + + −
∂
∂






Inserting the derivatives of (4) and (5) this condition now reads:
0 ) ) ( )( ( ) ) 1 ( ))( ( ) 1 (( = − + + − + + − + − + pw w l q w l dp d q w l l c d
Next insert p according to (4). After a series of rearrangements this can be
rewritten as.
[] [ ] 0 ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 ) ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 = + + + + − + − + + + − + q w l w w l l d c d w l w d w l l cd d a
Note that under assumption (A1) the second expression in brackets is
positive. It follows that the profit function of the publisher is concave in q.
Hence, the publisher will charge each bookseller a price of
[]
) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
) ( ) ( ) 1 (
) 6 (
2 w l w w l l d c d
w l w d w l l cd d a
q
+ + + + − +
+ + + − +
=
The remaining steps are conceptually simple: just insert (6) into (4) and
(5). As doing these steps and getting the result in the main part of the paper is
not that straightforward we offer some details here. Let us start with the price.
Inserting (6) into (4) gives
= + − + a p w l l c d / )) ( ) 2 ((
) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
) ( ) ( ) 1 (
)) ( ) 1 ((
2 w l w w l l d c d
w l w d w l l cd d
w l l c d c
+ + + + − +
+ + + − +
+ − + +
The right hand side of the equation above can therefore be written as:Resale Price Maintenance 17
) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
)) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 (
2
2
w l w w l l s d
w l w w l l d d c c
+ + + + − +
+ + + + − +
) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
) ( ) ( ) 1 ))(( ( ) 1 ((
2 w l w w l l s d
w l w d w l l cd d w l l c d
+ + + + − +
+ + + − + + − +
+
Next we focus on the numerator of this expression. Note that
 
cd d c d d d c ) 1 ( ) 2 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
2 + + + + = +
Therefore we can write the numerator as follows:
− + + + + + − + + + − + +
2 2 ) 1 ( ) ( )) ( ) 1 (( )) ( ) 2 )(( 1 ( d d c w l cw w l l c d cd w l l c d d c
2 2 2 2 ) ( ) ( 9 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 ) ( 2 w l lw w l w d c w l dl w l l cd w l cdl + − + + + + + + − +
[] [ ]+ + − + + + + − + + = ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( w l l c d w l w w l l c d d c
2 2 2 2 ) ( ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) 2 )( 1 ( w l dl w l cd w l cdl d d d c + + + − + − + +
[] [ ]+ + − + + + + − + + = ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( w l l c d w l w w l l c d d c
[ ] ) ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 )( 1 (
2 w l cdl d c d w l l w l dl d d d c + + − + − + + + + +
[] () cd d w l dl w l w c d w l l c d ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 2 ( + + + − + + + + − + =
From this expression the result for the price in the main body of the paper
follows immediately. Deriving the result for s poses no problems.
Appendix A3 Comparison of prices and service levels
Let us start with a comparison of the service levels:
2 2 2 ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2




w l w w l l d d c




+ + + + − +
+ +
=
[ ] ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 ) 2 )( )( 1 (
2 2 w l w w l l d d c l l c w l d + + + + − + < − + + ⇔
) )( ( ) )( 1 ( 2 dl w w l l dl w d c − + < − + ⇔Resale Price Maintenance 18
Because of assumption A1 this is equivalent to w < dl.
The price with RPM is higher than the price without RPM iff
[ ]
) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2




2 w l w w l l d d c





+ + + + − +




[ ] ) )( ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 2 2 2 w dl w l l w l d l c − + > + − + ⇔
[ ] 0 )) ( ) 2 (( ) ( > + + − + − ⇔ cw w l l c d l w dl
Again given assumption A1 this is equivalent to w  <  dl. This establishes
proposition 1.
Appendix A4 Social surplus effects







0 0 i i i i
p ls A
i p ls A p ls A dA A ls A
i i
+ + − + = − + ∫
− +
Given the symmetric configurations the aggregate gross utility of the other










α α β − = − ∫
At symmetric solutions social surplus is therefore
2 4 / ) )( ( ) , ( cs b es p ls A p ls A s p W − − + + + − + = β β
which can be rewritten as
2 2 2 2 ) ( ) ( 2 4 / ) , ( p s c l s bw Al b A s p W − − + + + − = β
As at w = dl prices and service levels are same under RPM and without
RPM, it is obvious that the social surplus is also the same in both situations.
We denote by Wc resp. WRPM the value of W, if the arguments ( pc, sc ) resp.
( pRPM, sRPM ) are inserted.Resale Price Maintenance 19
We consider now an increase in e which induces an increase in w without
changing any of the remaining parameters. When we change w ceteris paribus
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While this derivative is independent of the value of w, the derivative of Wc
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w
s
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which at w = dl collapses to
) 2 )( 1 (








The derivative of p with respect to w has similar appearance. In particular
it has same denominator. Let us denote the denominator by K. Then we have:
[] ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 ) 2 (
2 w l w w l l d d c w l dl a
w
p
K + + + + − + + + − =
∂
∂
[ ] ) 2 ) 2 1 ( ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 (
2 w l l d w l w w l dl d c a + + + − + + + − + −
which collapses at w = dl to
) 2 )( 1 (








Inserting these values in (7) yields at w = dlResale Price Maintenance 20
) 2 )( 1 ( 2
2
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Recalling that A = a – β/2 this can be simplified to
) 2 )( 1 ( 2
2












From this it follows that
0













which is the content of proposition 2.